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Introduction 
The bordering of migration across the Central Mediterranean Sea has been in the past 
years a striking laboratory wherefrom novel legal arrangements, surveillance 
technologies, and institutional assemblages have emerged at dazzling speed. The 
record number of people who have recently crossed the Sicily Channel (over 308,000 
people between January 2014 and October 2015 [UNHCR 2015]) as well as the 
record numbers migrant deaths at sea (more than 6,500 in the same period) have in 
fact spurred unprecedented responses, in particular after the tragic shipwreck of 3 
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October 2013, in which more than 366 people died only a few meters off the coast of 
Lampedusa. While historically the task of rescuing people in between Italy and Libya 
has been mainly entrusted to the Italian and Maltese Coast Guards and that of 
securing those maritime borders has been chiefly the mission of the Guardia di 
Finanza (the Italian customs police), in the last two years there has been a 
multiplication of actors involved in bordering and rescue practices, and rapid shifts in 
their missions and operational logics. 
 Broadly speaking, we can identify different phases of this engagement. First, 
the spectacular “Mare Nostrum” operation was launched by the Italian Navy in 
October 2013 with the military-humanitarian task of combining border control and 
rescue at sea. At the end of 2014, however, when Mare Nostrum came to be perceived 
as a “pull-factor” for migrants by EU member states, it was replaced by Frontex’s 
more limited “Triton” operation, which was specifically designed as a border control 
operation and not as a search and rescue mission. Following two shipwrecks where 
more than 1,200 people lost their lives in April 2015, Triton’s operational area was 
extended and the EU launched also the EUNAVFOR MED operation, with the aim of 
disrupting “smuggling and trafficking” networks. On top of these governmental or 
inter-governmental initiatives, two main non-governmental actors have also been 
operating off the coasts of Libya recently: commercial ships–which rescued 40,000 
people in 2014 alone (Migreurop 2015)–as well as civil society rescue vessels such as 
those operated by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF–Doctors Without Borders). 
 These different initiatives, however, should not be considered in temporal and 
spatial isolation. Their specific temporal extensions, operational aims, and zones of 
intervention have in fact often overlapped or entered in conflict with each other, in 
ways that have substantially shaped the Mediterranean space. Their spatial and 
temporal entanglement can be read as a revealing index not only of the institutional 
battles that have taken place across the EU and its national member states concerning 
the management of migration, but also of the civilian responses to this shifting 
situation. 
 The picture of the Mediterranean Sea that emerges is that of a highly contested 
and rapidly evolving border zone, which results in a regime of hierachized mobility. 
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Contrary to the popular representation of the maritime territory as a homogeneous and 
lawless expanse sitting outside the reach of state power, the sea appears here as 
laboratory for the contemporary transformation of the relation between territory, 
authority and rights, in which different forms of “unbundled sovereignty” (Sassen 
2006) are extended through variegated jurisdictional spaces and practices of mobile 
government (Heller and Pezzani 2014). The following maps seek to provide 
introductory elements for a spatial understanding of this shifting borderscape, of the 
frictions that have shaped it, and of how these affect the danger of sea crossings. 
The Italian Navy’s Mare Nostrum Operation 
Figure 1 here 
Figure 1: Mare Nostrum Operational Area 
(source: various press photos depicting Italian Navy maps) 
The military-humanitarian operation Mare Nostrum coordinated by the Italian Navy 
to rescue migrants at sea was launched on 18 October 2013, soon after two major 
shipwrecks that caused the deaths of more than 600 people at the beginning of that 
month. In both cases Italian authorities were accused of fatal delay in rescue 
operations.  Mare Nostrum marked a significant shift in the way in which military i
forces were publicly engaged in saving migrants, as for the first time military forces 
were presented as humanitarian actors in charge of saving migrants at sea. The units 
deployed by the Italian Navy were one amphibious vessel, two frigates and two 
corvettes, four helicopters, three planes and unmanned aerial vehicle (Marina Militare 
2015). These operated patrols in the central Mediterranean up to the limits of Libyan 
territorial waters–and sometimes intervening also inside–in order to rescue migrants 
in distress and disembark them in the ports of Southern Italy. The monthly cost of the 
operation for the Italian Navy was about 9.5 million Euros. The operation was also 
used for intercepting and seizing the so-called “mother-ships” in order to arrest 
migrants’ smugglers, and for identifying migrants–in some cases also by 
fingerprinting them onboard. The Mare Nostrum operation spurred heavy criticism 
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from several sides. The right-wing in Italy strongly opposed the military-humanitarian 
operation, accusing it of ferrying “illegal” migrants to the Italian coasts and of 
constituting a considerable “pull factor” for people fleeing wars. The latter position 
was echoed in the voices of other EU member states’ politicians, such as the UK 
Foreign Office minister, Lady Anelay, who used it in October 2014 to justify the UK’s 
unwillingness to offer financial support for the continuation of Mare Nostrum (The 
Guardian 2014). United Nations Rapporteur on Migrants’ Rights François Crépeau 
however noted that such a position amounted to using deaths at sea as a deterrent 
(OHCHR 2014). Mare Nostrum was in force until December 2014, after when it was 
terminated and effectively replaced by more limited Frontex mission Triton. The 
ending of Mare Nostrum was unanimously criticised by several human rights 
organisations, who predicted that the end of the mission would not lead to less 
crossings but rather to more deaths (see, for example, Amnesty International 2014; 
Human Rights Watch 2014). 
Frontex’s Triton Operation 
Figure 2 here 
Figure 2: Triton Operational Areas 
(source: for Phase 1, Frontex 2014; for Phase 2, map based on press sources and an 
interview conducted with Frontex International Coordination Centre [ICC] in Pratica 
di Mare) 
Frontex has been conducting joint missions to police the Central Mediterranean since 
2006, immediately following the agency’s creation. The first joint mission “Nautilus” 
was replaced by “Hermes” after the fall of the Ben Ali regime in January 2011 and in 
response to the several thousands of Tunisians who crossed the sea. Hermes was in 
turn replaced by Triton, which officially started in November 2014, but became 
effectively operative only in January 2015 in parallel with the phasing-out of the Mare 
Nostrum operation. Triton has a radically different operational mission from Mare 
Nostrum, as its primary mission has been that of border control: if assets operating 
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within Triton could be called upon to operate rescue, this would only be a secondary 
outcome in relation to its primary task. Moreover, Triton’s budget has also been much 
more limited than that of Mare Nostrum–initially 2.9 million Euros a month–meaning 
fewer available assets. Finally, instead of proactively patrolling the waters 
immediately off the Libyan coast as Mare Nostrum, Triton’s operational area was 
initially limited to an area extending up to 30 nautical miles from Lampedusa (EU 
Observer 2014). The prediction of the human rights community that these more 
limited means and shift in operational priority would lead to more deaths was soon 
confirmed: on 12 and 19 April 2015 more than 1,200 migrants died in two shipwrecks 
that occurred close to the Libyan coast when their boats capsized while commercial 
vessels were approaching them to operate rescue. In the aftermath of these events, the 
European Council decided to increase the budget of Triton and to extend its 
operational zone up to 138 nautical miles south of Lampedusa (Frontex 2015). 
Commercial Vessels 
Figure 3 here 
Figure 3: 19 April 2015 Shipwreck–Merchant Shipping Involvement 
(source: based on AIS data acquired through http://www.marinetraffic.com [AIS 
analysis by Rossana Padaletti, GIS and remote sensing specialist]; please note that 
this map is the preliminary outcome of an ongoing investigation and other vessels–not 
accounted for in the dataset currently in our possession–might have been present) 
The Sicily Channel is one the world’s busiest sea-lanes: it represents a choke point for 
ships transiting across the Mediterranean. Until 2014, the flow of commercial ships 
was left relatively unconcerned by the plight of migrants at sea. Since 2014 however, 
the shipping industry has been involved in rescue operations at an unprecedented 
level. According to the European Community Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA), 
commercial vessels rescued 42,061 people in 2014, i.e. 25.2% of the total number. In 
the first five months of 2015, the incidence of commercial ships’ mobilisation became 
even more important: the 14,769 people they rescued represent in fact 29% of the 
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total.  This has effectively made the merchant shipping industry the second largest ii
search and rescue (SAR) operator in the Mediterranean, well ahead of the contribution 
brought by the means deployed by Frontex in the frame of its Triton operation (8%) 
but also ahead of the authority officially entrusted with the task of carrying out SAR 
operations in the Sicily Channel, the Italian Coast Guard (27%). While commercial 
vessels have contributed to save thousands of people, their involvement has also 
posed serious challenges in terms of safety, as large vessels are not apt at operating 
very difficult rescue operations with overcrowded and unstable boats. The map above 
illustrates rescue operations that followed the shipwreck of 19 April 2015 in which 
more than 800 people died and which occurred at the start of the rescue operation run 
by King Jacob, a 147m long cargo ship. The ships’ tracks recorded by the Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) exemplify the deep involvement of the shipping industry 
during rescue operations. 
Non-Governmental Organizations’ Rescue Missions 
Figure 4 here 
Figure 4: MSF Rescue Vessel (Bourbon Argos) Operational Area 
(source: https://twitter.com/MSF_Sea/status/597737601584504832) 
The involvement of non-governmental organizations and private actors in rescue 
operations started in the summer of 2014, when a wealthy Maltese couple launched 
the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), a rescue operation that aimed at patrolling 
the Central Mediterranean and was equipped with a 40-metre rescue ship (the 
Phoenix) and with drones in order to support national authorities in saving migrants at 
sea.  The privatization of rescue and the engagement of humanitarian actors increased iii
between 2014 and 2015, especially after the end of Mare Nostrum. In May 2015, 
MSF and MOAS launched a joint search, rescue and medical aid operation in the 
Mediterranean. In addition to the joint operation conducted with MOAS, MSF started 
search and rescue operations on board of the boats Bourbon Argos and Dignity I 
(MSF 2015). The main patrolling and rescuing areas of MOAS and MSF have so far 
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been the Libyan coast near Tripoli and Zuwara. Actually, MSF stresses that saving 
migrants in distress at sea cannot be the real solution to the migration crisis, since it is 
the visa regime that is responsible for deaths at sea. In May 2015, Sea-Watch, an 
independent first aid and rescue operation initiated by a group of German citizens, 
sailed to the central Mediterranean.  In the summer of 2015 the boats of non-iv
governmental and private actors were the only ones, together with those of the Italian 
Navy and Coast Guard, to go close to the Libyan waters to patrol the sea and rescue 
migrants in distress. Both the Phoenix operation and Sea-Watch ended in September 
2015. An additional initiative of this kind, SOS Mediterranee, is currently undertaking 
a crowdfunding campaign to fund its first rescue mission.  v
The EUNAVOFR MED Mission and Other Military Ships 
Figure 5 here 
Figure 5: EUNAVOFR MED Operational Area 
(Please note that the operational area of the EUNAVFOR MED mission has not been 
made public, so the area represented on the map is entirely notional. However, since 
activities within the Libyan territorial waters have not been authorized, it can be 
inferred that most military assets are operating near the edge of the Libyan territorial 
waters represented on the map.) 
On 22 June 2015, the EUNAVFOR MED operation was launched. It represents the 
first military EU operation officially put into place to fight migrant smugglers, and 
hence represents an unprecedented step in coordinating EU states in the area of 
militarized migration management. The vessels that operate in the frame of the 
military operation are five planes (respectively, one from France, one from 
Luxembourg, two from Italy, and one from the UK) and four ships (one from Italy, 
two from Germany, and one from the UK). The EU military operation is planned for 
being conducted in three stages: surveillance and information gathering on smuggling 
networks; search and diversion of suspect vessels; and disposal of the vessels and 
apprehension of migrant smugglers. Phase three involves entering Libyan national 
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waters and requires the approval of Libyan authorities. Despite its official mandate–a 
military mission to dismantle the network of traffickers and smugglers–the 
humanitarian discourse does not remain out of the horizon of EUNAVFOR MED: the 
European Union, in fact, presents it as an operation tasked with “protecting life at 
sea”. However, rescuing migrants is clearly not the operational priority of 
EUNAVFOR MED. For instance, the UK’s HMS Enterprise taking part in the mission 
is a case in point: during eight weeks of deployment near the Libyan coast at the 
outset of the operation, it rescued no migrant (The Independent 2015). Recently, 
however, more rescue operations were carried out by the EUNAVFOR MED fleet. On 
13 October 2015, EUNAVFOR MED stated that in less than four months the military-
humanitarian operation had been “involved in several rescue activities contributing to 
save the life [sic] of more than 3,400 migrants” (EUNAVFOR MED 2015) It is 
actually a very small number, if compared to the rescue operations conducted by a 
non-governmental organization like MSF which rescued 16,350 people in its first five 
months of activity (MSF 2015). In the summer of 2015, Ireland launched its own 
military-humanitarian mission, following the country’s refusal to be part of Triton, the 
operation run by Frontex. “Pontus”, an operation of the Irish Naval Service, rescued 
7,000 migrants in the Mediterranean between May and September 2015. 
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